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CONSTITUTIONAL WRONGS WITHOUT
REMEDIES: EXECUTIVE OFFICIAL
IMMUNITY
SHELDON H. NAHMOD*
/T]he language of deterrence and of cost/beneft analysis, if used indis-
criminately, can have a narcotic effect. It creates an illusion of techni-
cal precision and ineluctability. It suggests that not only constitutional
princple but also empirical data support the majority's result...
/We. . . have been drawn into a curious world where the "costs"..
loom to exaggerated heights and where the "benefits". . . are made to
disappear with a mere wave of the hand **
Most state and federal executive officials are protected from section
1983' and Bivens2 liability by the affirmative defense of qualified im-
munity Qualified immunity was first applied in a section 1983 setting
to police officers,4 and was thereafter extended to governors,5 school
* Professor, Illinois Institute of Technology/Chicago - Kent College of Law. B.A. 1962,
University of Chicago; J.D. 1965, Harvard University; L.L.M. 1971, Harvard University. This
article was written under a grant from the Summer Research Stipend Program of Chicago - Kent
College of Law.
** United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3430 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing
Court's "good faith" exception to fourth amendment's exclusionary rule when search warrant
issued by a "detached and neutral magistrate"). See infra notes 146-60 and accompanying text
(discussing cost-benefit analysis in qualified immunity context).
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 reads as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable
exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District
of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
2. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (implied fourth amendment
cause of action for damages against federal law enforcement officers). See also Carlson v. Green,
446 U.S. 14 (1980) (implied eighth amendment cause of action for damages); Davis v. Passman,
442 U.S. 228 (1979) (implied fifth amendment cause of action for damages).
3. Qualified immunity was characterized as an affirmative defense for burden of pleading
purposes in Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980). The Court's reasoning, however, appears
equally applicable to the burden of proof. See S. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
LITIGATION: A GUIDE TO SECTION 1983 § 8.13 (1979 and Supp. 1984).
4. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
5. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
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board members,6 mental hospital officials,7 and prison officials." Quali-
fied immunity in a 3ivens setting has been applied to federal executive
officials, including members of the President's cabinet9 and his aides.' °
Whether applied in section 1983 orBivens cases, qualified immunity is
generally thought to reflect a balancing of the individual and social
interests in protection from, and compensation for, constitutional dep-
rivations against the social interest in independent decision making by
executive officials."
A clear trend favoring executives has emerged, however. Thus, the
balancing of the above interests has resulted in a different rule for the
President of the United States: the President is protected by absolute
immunity' 2 for acts within the "outer perimeter" of his official respon-
sibilities.1 3 In addition, federal executive officials who perform judicial
and prosecutorial functions in connection with federal agency adjudi-
catory proceedings are protected by absolute immunity analogous to
the absolute immunity from damages liability afforded judges and
prosecutors. 14 Moreover, until recently, the qualified immunity test
had two hurdles for defendants: an objective part and a subjective
part.' The Supreme Court, however, has done away with the subjec-
tive part of the test. 6 In so doing, the Court went far towards con-
verting the form of qualified immunity into the substance of absolute
immunity.
This development is more than simply another example of the way
in which the Court recently has moved to limit constitutional tort lia-
bility.'7 The Court increasingly is concerned with the potential for con-
6. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1978).
7. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
8. Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978).
9. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
10. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 427 U.S. 800 (1982).
11. See infra notes 131-93 and accompanying text. While this Article focuses on executive
immunity, qualified immunity has been held to protect private defendants in certain circum-
stances, e.g., Buller v. Buechler, 706 F.2d 844 (8th Cir. 1983); see also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil
Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982) (dictum).
12. Where absolute immunity is applicable, an action will typically be dismissed on motion
setting out the defendant's official capacity. See generally S. NAHMOD, supra note 3, at ch. 7.
13. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S 731 (1982).
14. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508-16 (1978).
15. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
16. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
17. See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984) (no procedural due process violation
for negligent or intentional taking of property so long as adequate state tort remedy; holdings
capable of expansion to the taking of a liberty interest and to substantive due process as well); City
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stitutional tort liability to overdeter government employees in the
performance of their duties. This concern has led the Court to limit
individual liability to cases of extreme misconduct, in order to provide
government employees with a significant margin for error. At the same
time, local government liability for unconstitutional official policies or
customs under section 1983,18 and federal government liability under
the Federal Tort Claims Act, 19 also may have encouraged the Court to
limit individual liability in this manner.
The Court's concern with overdeterrence is surely legitimate; there is
a strong social interest in independent decision-making by government
employees. Moreover, the Court's recent case law brings qualified im-
munity law more in line with the doctrine of nonretroactive application
of newly announced and unexpected legal rules."0 It also reflects a re-
lated sensitivity to the legal process factors of understanding rules, and
the ability to comply with them.2 ' There are, however, strong social
interests in constitutional compliance as well. To the extent that the
Court's recent case law reflects an obsessive concern with overdeter-
rence, it will tend to underprotect these social interests. In my view, if
we do not know enough to regulate conduct perfectly, we should better
run the risk of overdeterring unconstitutional conduct than of un-
derdeterring it.
Part I of this Article provides a retrospective which shows the devel-
opment of section 1983 qualified immunity doctrine. In Part II, federal
executive immunity, including the Court's emphasis on function and
presidential immunity, is considered. Part III critically analyzes the
of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 103 S. Ct. 1660 (1983) (limiting section 1983 plaintiff's standing to seek
injunctive relief); Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981) (public defender who represents
criminal defendant does not act under color of law); City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453
U.S. 247 (1981) (local government absolutely immune from punitive damages liability); Parratt v.
Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981) (no procedural due process violation for negligent or intentional tak-
ing of property so long as adequate state tort remedy available; holdings capable of expansion to
the taking of a liberty interest and to substantive due process as well); cf. Bush v. Lucas, 103 S. Ct.
2404 (1983) (first amendment Bivens actions not available to federal employees covered by elabo-
rate congressional remedial scheme); Chappell v. Wallace, 103 S. Ct. 2362 (1983) (Bivens actions
against superior officers not available to enlisted military personnel).
18. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) (no immunity available under section
1983 to local governments); Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (local
government liability under section 1983 for unconstitutional official policies or customs; overruled
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961)).
19. Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (enacted as Title 4 under the Legislative
Reorganization Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 812) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
20, See infra text accompanying notes 171-78.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 179-83.
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Court's current approach to executive immunity, as reflected especially
in Harlow v. Fitzgerald22 with its questionable reliance on cost-benefit
analysis.
I. SECTION 1983 QUALIFIED IMMUNITY: A RETROSPECTIVE
A. Pierson v. Ray: A Modest Beginning
The United States Supreme Court's first section 1983 qualified im-
munity case involving police officers was Pierson v. Ray3 3 The plain-
tiffs, peaceful sit-in demonstrators, asserted they had been arrested
under a breach of the peace statute subsequently held unconstitutional.
Focusing on the adverse effect of a no-immunity rule for police officers
and the consequent need for a margin for error, the Court noted:
Under the prevailing view in this country a peace officer who arrests
someone with probable cause is not liable for false arrest simply because
the innocence of the suspect is later proved. . . . A policeman's lot is not
so unhappy that he must choose between being charged with dereliction
of duty if he does not arrest when he has probable cause, and being
mulcted in damages if he does. Although the matter is not entirely free
from doubt, the same consideration would seem to require excusing him
from liability for acting under a statute that he reasonably believed to be
valid but that was later held unconstitutional, on its face or as applied.24
The Court in Pierson used the same statutory interpretation ap-
proach it had previously used when it ruled in Tenney v. Brandhove2 1
that the common law background of state legislator immunity was in-
tended by Congress-when it enacted section 1983 in 187 1-to apply to
section 1983 liability of state legislators. The Court in Pierson asserted
"that a police officer is not charged with predicting the future course of
constitutional law," 26 went on to apply the Monroe v. Pape27 "back-
ground of tort liability" 28 approach, and thereby established the quali-
fied immunity defense of good faith and probable cause.
22. 427 U.S. 800 (1982).
23. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
24. Id. at 555 (citations and footnotes omitted).
25. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
26. 386 U.S. at 557.
27. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
28. For a discussion of the proper meaning of this phrase, see Nahmod, Section 1983 and the
"Background" of Tort Liability, 50 IND. L.J. 5 (1974). Tort law should inform section 1983 doc-
trine, but not determine it. Section 1983 is, after all, a federal statute vindicating fourteenth
amendment rights.
[Vol. 62:221
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B. Scheuer v. Rhodes: Upper Level Executives
Pierson involved law enforcement officers, or "street level" execu-
tives. Some years later, the Court applied a comparable reasonable
good faith standard to the highest state executives. Scheuer v. Rhodes29
dealt with section 1983 actions against the Governor of Ohio, the Adju-
tant General and his assistant, various named and unnamed officers
and enlisted members of the Ohio National Guard, and the President
of Kent State University. All these actions arose out of the death of
three university students during alleged civil disorders. The Court held
that qualified, rather than absolute, immunity was applicable. The
Court admitted the usefulness of the common law rule of absolute im-
munity for high ranking executives, noting that the "public interest re-
quires decisions and action to enforce laws for the protection of the
public." 3° However, in addition to considering the harm to this interest
stemming from the possibility of section 1983 liability, the Court con-
sidered the purposes of section 1983. It found that granting absolute
immunity to executives would drain section 1983 of all meaning. After
discussing Pierson and considering the differences in the extent of dis-
cretion for law enforcement executives at the police level and those at
higher levels, the Court held:
[11n varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of the ex-
ecutive branch of government, the variation being dependent upon the
scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circum-
stances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action on which
liability is sought to be based. It is the existence of reasonable grounds
for the belief formed at the time and in light of all the circumstances,
coupled with good-faith belief, that affords a basis for qualified immunity
of executive officers for acts performed in the course of official conduct.31
In Scheuer, the Court more clearly articulated the emerging two-part
qualified immunity test. The objective part related to reasonable
grounds for a defendant's belief in the legal validity of his conduct.
The subjective part dealt with the existence of such a belief in fact. In
addition, the Court enumerated the costs involved if it were to adopt an
absolute liability rule. First, there would be an injustice to the officer if
liability were imposed when discretion must be exercised. Second,
such liability would have a chilling effect upon an officer's exercise of
29. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
30. Id. at 241.
31. Id. at 247-48.
Number 21 225
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judgment and discretion through overdeterrence. The Court observed
that the exercise of judgment and discretion includes an officer's failure
to act when necessary.
At the same time, the Court explained the costs involved in adopting
an absolute immunity rule for higher level executives. Section 1983
would be inapplicable to those executives; thus, the costs of their con-
stitutional violations would be borne solely by those injured. Further,
section 1983 would perform no deterrent function for those executives.
An absolute immunity rule would have been especially anomalous in
view of the fact that police officers who individually can do far less
harm than governors are protected only by qualified immunity.
C Wood v. Strickland: The Duty to Know
Wood v. Strickland,32 decided a year after Scheuer, was the Court's
most important qualified immunity case at the time. In Wood, the
plaintiffs were expelled from school for violating a regulation prohibit-
ing intoxicating beverages at school or school activities. Bringing sec-
tion 1983 actions against school board members for damages and other
relief, the plaintiffs alleged that the expulsions violated procedural and
substantive due process. The Court observed that "state courts have
generally recognized that [school board members] should be protected
from tort liability under state law for all good-faith, nonmalicious ac-
tion taken to fulfill their official duties."33 It went on to acknowledge
that school board members function variously as legislators and adju-
dicators, functions which involve the exercise of considerable discretion
over both the long and short term. The Court nevertheless held that
school board members are protected by only qualified immunity.
But the Court's holding did not stop there. The Court added an im-
portant gloss to what it called the objective part of the qualified immu-
nity test:
The official himself must be acting sincerely and with a belief that he is
doing right, but an act violating a student's constitutional rights can be no
more justified by ignorance or disregard of settled, indisputable law on the
part of one entrusted with supervision of students' daily lives than by the
presence of actual malice. To be entitled to a special exemption from the
categorical remedial language of § 1983 in a case in, which his action vio-
lated a student's constitutional rights, a school board member, who has
32. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
33. Id. at 318 (footnote omitted).
[Vol. 62:221
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voluntarily undertaken the task of supervising the operation of the school
and the activities of the students, must be held to a standard of conduct
based not only on permissible intentions, but also on knowledge of the
basic, unquestioned constitutional rights of his charges. Such a standard
imposes neither an unfair burden upon a person assuming a responsible
public office requiring a high degree of intelligence and judgment for the
proper fulfillment of its duties, nor an unwarranted burden in light of the
value which civil rights have in our legal system. Any lesser standard
would deny much of the promise of § 1983. Therefore, in the specific con-
text of school discipline, we hold that a school board member is not immune
from liabilityfor damages under § 1983 if he knew or reasonably should
have known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility
would violate the constitutional rights of the student affected, or f he took
the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitu-
tional rights or other injury to the student.34
It is important to note that Wood's duty to know settled law did not
necessarily limit the objective part of the test. Wood could be read to
expand it to cover those situations when a defendant might fail the
objective part as a matter of law. Thus, even when there is no settled
law in a given case, a defendant might still be found to have acted
unreasonably and thereby fail the test.3 1 Wood was also significant be-
cause it modified the subjective part of the qualified immunity test by
framing it as an inquiry into the existence of malicious intent to violate
a student's constitutional rights or to cause other injury.
The dissenting opinion criticized the majority's duty to know re-
quirement as imposing "a higher standard of care upon public school
officials sued under Section 1983, than that previously required of any
other official." 36 The dissent characterized this second guessing by a
factflnder of a school board member's decision-making as a "harsh
standard," because of the difficulty that even lawyers and legal scholars
have in describing constitutional rights as "settled" and "indisputable."
The dissent also questioned whether most school boards and officials
have "ready access" to counsel in making many decisions for the oper-
ation of public schools. Moreover, the dissent emphasized the effect of
potential liability upon the willingness of citizens to serve on school
boards.
34. Id. at 321-22 (emphasis added).
35. Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1133, 1214-17
(1977),
36. 420 U.S. at 327 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Number 2]
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As it had done in Scheuer, the Court in Wood spoke of the potential
costs of no immunity protection whatever. In addition to the costs
mentioned in Scheuer regarding independent decision-making, the
Court was concerned with discouraging potential candidates from vol-
unteering to serve on school boards. When it balanced these interests,
the Court concluded that when there is clearly settled law, a govern-
mental employee may be under an obligation to know and comply with
it, an obligation comparable to the common knowledge required of the
reasonable person in tort law.37 In contrast, the dissenters emphasized
the costs of access to counsel stemming from Wood's duty to know set-
tled law and expressed doubt whether any constitutional doctrine could
be settled.38
P. Procunier v. Navarette: A Step Back?
In Procunier v. Navarette,39 the Court held that qualified, not abso-
lute, immunity protects prison officials at both the supervisory, high
discretion level and the subordinate, ministerial, minimal discretion
level. While in this respect Navarette appears to limit the protection of
prison executives, in reality Navarette cuts back on Wood's duty to
know settled law by applying it restrictively. Navarette also shows that
the statement of a general rule is only as sound as its application.
37. Eg., Delair v. McAdoo, 324 Pa. 392, 188 A. 181 (1936). See generally W. PROSSER, LAW
OF TORTS 157-61 (4th ed. 1971).
38. 420 U.S. at 329-31 (Powell, J., dissenting).
39. 434 U.S. 555 (1978).
Between Wood and Navarette, the Court decided O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975),
which held that mental hospital officials, like school officials, are protected by qualified immunity.
O'Connor was an action against the superintendent of a mental hospital and others for allegedly
confining plaintiff wrongfully for 15 years. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff and the Fifth
Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the jury verdict to the extent that it included a
finding that the superintendent had knowingly violated plaintiffs right to freedom. However, the
Court remanded to the Fifth Circuit to consider whether the trial court's instructions to the jury on
the defendant's qualified immunity were correct in light of Wood.
The trial court had instructed the jury that the defendant was immune from damages
[if he] reasonably believed in good faith that the detention of [plaintiff] was proper for
the length of time he was so confined .... However, mere good intentions which do
not give rise to a reasonable belief that detention is lawfully required cannot justify
[plaintiff's] confinement in the Florida State Hospital.
Id. at 571-72. The trial court had also rejected defendant's requested instruction that "if defend-
ants acted pursuant to a statute which was not declared unconstitutional at the time, they cannot
be held accountable for such action." Remanding in light of Wood, the Court directed the Fifth
Circuit to consider whether the trial court's refusal "to instruct with regard to the effect of [defend-
ant's] claimed reliance on state law rendered inadequate the instructions as to [defendant's] liabil-
ity." Id. at 577.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol62/iss2/3
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Plaintiff, a prison inmate, sued the director of the California Depart-
ment of Corrections, the warden and assistant warden of a state prison
(supervisory officials), two correctional counselors, and a member of
the prison staff in charge of handling incoming and outgoing mail
(subordinate officials) on various section 1983 grounds, including negli-
gent interference with his constitutional right to mail outgoing letters.
On appeal from a grant of summary judgment for all defendants, the
Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the plaintiff had stated a section
1983 cause of action and that summary judgment was improper.40 On
certiorari, the Supreme Court found that summary judgment for de-
fendants was appropriate on qualified immunity grounds.4'
The Navarette Court characterized the qualified immunity available
to executives, school board members, mental hospital superintendents,
and policemen as a unitary standard and quoted the Scheuer v.
Rhodes42 reasonable grounds, good faith belief formulation. It then
applied the two-part test elaborated in Wood to the defendants. The
objective part related first, to whether at the time of the challenged con-
duct, 1971 and 1972, the defendants knew or should have known of the
existence of the right asserted and second, to whether they knew or
should have known that they were violating the protected right. The
Court found that the defendants neither knew nor should have known,
because there was no such federal right at the time. It observed that the
Ninth Circuit itself had only upheld such a right in 1973 and 1974 and
that a three-judge court opinion from California to the same effect was
also decided in 1973.
4 3
Furthermore, the Supreme Court's own 1974 opinion on a similar
issue dealt with it from the perspective of the constitutional right of the
addressee, rather than the perspective of the prisoner, as in Navarette.4
Other California federal district court decisions from 1970 through
1972, offered by the plaintiff to show that a prisoner's right to send mail
was clearly established by 1971 and 1972, were described by the Court
as distinguishable and inapposite to a showing of a clearly established
right.45 Thus, because no decisions of the Supreme Court, the various
circuit courts, or the local district court definitively set out a prisoner's
40. 434 U.S. at 558.
41. Id. at 558, 566.
42. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
43. 434 U.S. at 563.
44. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
45. 434 U.S. at 564.
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right to send mail in 1971 and 1972, the Court held as a matter of law
that defendants acted reasonably and without "disregard" for the es-
tablished law.
The Court also elaborated on the subjective part of the qualified im-
munity test, which it had described in Wood as an inquiry into whether
a defendant acted with "the malicious intention to cause a deprivation
of constitutional rights or other injury."46 The Navarette Court charac-
terized this part of the test as speaking "of 'intentional injury,' contem-
plating that the actor intends the consequences of his conduct."47 It
also cited section 8A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which de-
fines "intent" as including a belief that "the consequences are substan-
tially certain to result" from the act.48 Because the defendants were all
charged with either negligent interference with plaintiffs mail or with
negligent failure to provide proper training to mail handlers, the Court
found that the defendants' intent to cause harm was clearly not at issue.
Thus, the Court held as a matter of law that the defendants passed the
subjective part of the qualified immunity test.
Navarette added little to the Court's earlier approach to section 1983
statutory interpretation and its articulation of the specific costs impli-
cated by the qualified immunity test. However, by reading Wood as
limiting liability to those situations when clearly settled law is vio-
lated,49 and by a narrow application of the concept of settled law, the
Court was apparently beginning to reconsider whether the qualified
immunity test was overdeterring government employees.
In summary, Pierson, Scheuer, Wood, and Navarette established that
state and local executive officials were protected by an elaborate two-
part qualified immunity test. This test was justified as a matter of stat-
utory interpretation, emphasis being on the common law background
in existence in 1871 when section 1983 was enacted. In addition, the
test was premised on a two-faceted policy of not overdeterring execu-
tives in the performance of their duties on the one hand, and of not
underprotecting constitutional rights on the other. This policy was
designed, if only implicitly, to achieve optimum deterrence. Closely
related was the Court's worry that liability imposed through retroactive
46. 420 U.S. at 322.
47. 434 U.S. at 566.
48. Id.
49. See supra note 35 and accompanying text; see also Davis v. Scherer, 104 S. Ct. 3012, 3018
(1984) (Court applied clearly settled law component of qualified immunity test in pro-defendant
manner); infra note 168.
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application of newly established constitutional doctrine would not only
overdeter but also would be unfair. These considerations were simi-
larly applied by the Court to justify qualified immunity for most fed-
eral executive officials.
II. FEDERAL EXECUTIVE OFFICIALS
A. Butz v. Economou: Form Follows Function
Butz v. Economou,5 ° the seminal Supreme Court decision dealing
with the scope of immunity in Bivens5' actions, established several im-
portant principles. First, Butz made clear that even members of the
President's cabinet are not absolutely immune from Bivens liability.
Instead, they are only protected by the qualified immunity developed
for state and local government executives in section 1983 actions. 2
Second, Butz established that those executives who function as judges
and prosecutors in connection with federal agency adjudicatory pro-
ceedings are protected by absolute immunity.5
Butz involved a damages action brought against various officials in
the Department of Agriculture who had investigated plaintiff and his
corporation and had initiated an adjudicatory proceeding against him.
The defendants included the Secretary and Assistant Secretary of Agri-
culture, the Judicial Office and Chief Hearing Examiner, the agency
attorney who presented the enforcement proceeding, and several audi-
tors who investigated plaintiff, or who were witnesses against him. Sev-
eral of plaintiffs claims were based on the first and fifth amendments.54
The district court dismissed the action on the ground that the defend-
ants were absolutely immune from liability for all discretionary actions
within the scope of their authority.5  The Second Circuit reversed and
held that all the defendants were protected by only qualified immu-
nity.56 Vacating and remanding, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by
Justice White, held that the defendant agency officials were protected
by qualified immunity except insofar as their challenged conduct con-
sisted of initiating, continuing, or prosecuting the adjudicatory pro-
50, 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
51. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 338 (1974); see supra note 2.
52. Eg., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 238 (1974).
53. 438 U.S. at 508-17.
54. Id. at 483 n.5.
55. Id. at 483-84.
56. Id. at 484-85.
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ceeding, or acting as judges in that proceeding. 7
The Court rejected an across the board absolute immunity rule for
federal executive officials. It distinguished its earlier plurality opinion
in Barr v. Matteo, 8 which applied absolute immunity to the discretion-
ary conduct of the acting director of an agency who had been sued by
former employees for malicious defamation. In Barr, the executive's
conduct was within the outer perimeter of his line of duty, while here,
because the challenged conduct was allegedly unconstitutional, it was
unauthorized.5 9 The Court similarly distinguished Spalding v. Vilas,60
which held the Postmaster General to be absolutely immune from lia-
bility for defamation and interference with plaintiff's contractual rela-
tionships. According to the Butz Court, the defendant in Spalding also
had not acted beyond the scope of his official duties.
Further, while Barr and Spalding did not address the executive im-
munity issue in connection with constitutionally derived Bivens actions,
the analogous issue had already been considered by the Court in the
section 1983 case of Scheuer v. Rhodes.6 The Court reasoned that if,
under Scheuer, a state's highest executive-its Governor-and other
executive officials are protected only by qualified immunity, then a
similar standard also should apply to federal executives sued pursuant
to Bivens. The Court stated:
[I]n the absence of congressional direction to the contrary, there is no
basis for according to federal officials a higher degree of immunity from
liability when sued for a constitutional infringement as authorized by Biv-
ens than is accorded state officials when sued for the identical violation
under section 1983.62
Finally, granting absolute immunity to all executive officials exercising
discretion would undercut the Bivens holding.63
Nevertheless, the Court went on to assert that there may be "excep-
57. Id. at 486, 516.
58. 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
59. Some question this distinction and consequently argue that Barr is no longer good law
even for common law tort actions. See, e.g., Note, Government Immunity-Civii Rights-Constitu.
tional Law-Scope of Immunit Available to Federal Executive Officials, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 604.
60. 161 U.S. 483 (1896).
61. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
62. 438 U.S. at 500.
63. Analogously, it has been argued that the legislative history of section 1983 demonstrates
that higher level executives should not be absolutely immune from section 1983 liability. See
Freed, Executive OjFcial Immunity for Constitutional Violations: An Analysis and a Critique, 72
Nw. U. L. REV. 526 (1977) (pre-Butz).
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tional situations where it is demonstrated that absolute [executive] im-
munity is essential for the conduct of the public business."64
Canvassing decisions holding that judges and prosecutors are abso-
lutely immune from common law and constitutional damages liabil-
ity,65 the Court ruled that despite their status as executives, 66 executive
officials exercising such special functions are entitled to absolute immu-
nity in connection with those functions. Because adjudication within a
federal administrative agency shares many important characteristics of
the judicial process, 67 hearing examiners and administrative law judges
are "functionally comparable" to judges and should be protected by
absolute immunity. Similarly, agency executives performing functions
comparable to those of a prosecutor are also entitled to absolute immu-
nity.68 This includes those who initiate or continue adjudicatory pro-
ceedings, as well as agency attorneys who conduct such proceedings. 69
Justice Rehnquist, together with Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Stewart and Stevens, concurred as to those executives protected by ab-
solute immunity, but dissented as to those executives protected only by
qualified immunity.7" They argued that Spalding and Barr could not
be satisfactorily reconciled with Butz, that constitutional and common
law claims frequently cannot be readily distinguished,71 and that sec-
tion 1983 qualified immunity principles should not apply to Bivens ac-
tions against federal executives. 72 They also emphasized the potential
for disruption and predicted that courts would have difficulty weeding
out insubstantial claims, even on summary judgment motions, because
the parties typically will dispute the state of mind inquiry implicated in
64. 438 U.S. at 507.
65. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Yaselli v.
Goff, 275 U.S. 503 (1927), summarily affg 12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S.
335 (1871).
66. The Butz defendants' executive status had been relied on by the Second Circuit.
67. According to the Court, these factors included the following: the similarity of the powers
of hearing examiners and judges; the exercise by hearing examiners of independent judgment free
from pressures; and the similarity of procedural safeguards in adjudicatory and judicial proceed-
rngs. 438 U.S. at 513-14.
68. Id. at 513.
69. Id. at 515-17.
70. Id. at 517 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
71. Consider the long running debate as to whether negligence is actionable under section
1983. See, e.g., Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981). See generally Nahmod, ConstitutionalAc-
countabihty' in Section 1983 Litigation, 68 IowA L. REv. 1 (1982).
72. 438 U.S. at 524-26.
Number 2]
Washington University Open Scholarship
234 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
the subjective part of the qualified immunity test.7" Thus, these Jus-
tices would have Bivens actions available only against lower level exec-
utives, including law enforcement officers.
Butz made the executive official immunity rules of section 1983
largely applicable to Bivens actions. The Court characterized these
rules as derived from a combination of policy analysis and section 1983
statutory interpretation, and not from the Constitution.74 This means
that Congress could, if it wanted, change those rules. It also follows
that the way in which the qualified immunity test is applied to execu-
tive officials in section 1983 cases is instructive for Bivens actions as
well. In reaching this conclusion, the Court pointed out the need to
reconcile a plaintifi's right to compensation for a constitutional depri-
vation with the need to protect the decision-making process of an exec-
utive department. Although there was concern for independent
decision-making, the Court found absolute immunity generally not ap-
propriate because the greater power of higher executives afforded them
greater potential for lawless conduct.75
For the first time in a qualified immunity case, the Court in Butz
took an expressly functional approach to the scope of immunity issue.
While most executives were entitled to qualified immunity, executive
status did not automatically confer qualified immunity protection. The
Court's sensitivity both to the need for executive flexibility76 and to the
nonexecutive functions of certain executive officials led it to decide that
those executives acting as judges or prosecutors in adjudicatory pro-
ceedings should, like their judge and prosecutor counterparts, be abso-
lutely immune.
Several observations should be made in this regard. First, those ex-
ecutive officials who primarily77 adjudicate, such as hearing examiners
and administrative law judges, and those who primarily prosecute, such
as agency attorneys who conduct adjudicatory proceedings, will always
73. Id. at 527. The significance of the prediction is demonstrated by Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800 (1982), which changed the qualified immunity test for this very reason. See Infra text
accompanying notes 116-129.
74. 438 U.S. at 497.
75. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 241-49 (1974).
76. This factor was surely critical to the Court's decision in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731
(1982), see infra notes 94-114, that the President of the United States is absolutely immune from
damages liability for official conduct within the outer perimeter of his duties.
77. Even full-time judges and prosecutors will sometimes perform acts of a non-judicial and
non-prosecutorial nature which are not protected by absolute immunity. For example, judges hire
and fire-administrative acts-and prosecutors investigate-a non-advocacy law enforcement act.
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be protected by absolute immunity for their judicial and prosecutorial
acts. Second, those executive officials who only sometimes execute and
only sometimes initiate or continue adjudicatory proceedings will be
protected by qualified immunity for the former and by absolute immu-
nity for the latter. Distinguishing between these kinds of acts is not
always easy, because often a decision to investigate, for example, can
sensibly be described as closely related to a decision to prosecute.78
The Court's functional approach in Butz leaves no alternative but to
draw such lines.
Butz's focus on adjudicatory proceedings raises the question whether
executive official conduct in federal agency rulemaking proceedings 79 is
similarly protected by absolute immunity. The promulgation of legis-
lative-type regulations8 ° might be absolutely immune by analogy both
to the absolute immunity of federal and state legislators for legislative
acts8' and to the absolute immunity of state judges for legislative acts
made under delegated legislative authority over a particular subject
matter.82 If function is determinative, then absolute immunity should
apply to such executive official legislative conduct, as well as to judicial
and prosecutorial conduct.
In addition, the Court increasingly has applied its functional ap-
proach to section 1983 cases involving both qualified and absolute im-
munity. The Court has held that when regional legislators function
like state legislators they are absolutely immune from section 1983 lia-
bility for their legislative acts. 3 Police officers, ordinarily protected by
qualified immunity, are protected by absolute immunity from liability
for their testimony as witnesses in state criminal trials.84 The Court
also has ruled, as noted earlier, that state judges, who are delegated
legislative powers over a particular subject, are protected by absolute
immunity for their legislative acts.85
A functional approach does not, however, lead inevitably to more
78. Eg., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). See also Comment, Qualfied Immunity
for Executive Officialsfor Constitutional Violations: Butz v. Economou, 20 B.C.L. REV. 575 (1979).
79. Federal agency rulemaking is described in part at 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982).
80. When validly enacted, certain agency rules and regulations have the force and effect of
federal law and are called "legislative" in contrast to "interpretative" rules.
81. Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975) (congressmen); Tenney
v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (state legislators).
82. Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719 (1980).
83. Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979).
84. Briscoe v. Lahue, 103 S. Ct. 1108 (1983).
85. Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719 (1980).
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protection for an official. For example, the Court has held that state
judges are not protected by absolute immunity from injunctive relief
liability for their prosecutorial role in initiating law enforcement.16 It
has also intimated that a congressman is not absolutely immune from
damages liability for a challenged administrative act constituting sex
discrimination." Thus, while a functional approach frequently will
benefit those defendants ordinarily protected by qualified immunity,
there will also be times when defendants such as legislators and judges
who ordinarily are protected by absolute immunity for their legislative
and judicial acts will not be so protected from liability for nonlegisla-
tive and nonjudicial acts.
Butz's functional approach has had considerable impact on the cir-
cuit courts as well. Increasingly, courts are conferring absolute immu-
nity on local legislators for their legislative acts, 88 and on parole board
officials and other executives for what is termed their quasi-judicial
conduct.89 Taken to an extreme, the Butz approach could result in un-
dermining that part of Wood v. Strickland which applied qualified im-
munity to the quasi-judicial conduct of school board members in
disciplinary proceedings. Even if a qualified immunity line could be
drawn around school board members on the ground that their common
law immunity so warrants, a functional approach could ultimately ap-
ply to the quasi-judicial conduct of members of state and local govern-
ment agencies. 90
In any event, Butz made clear that, notwithstanding the absolute im-
munity from tort liability conferred on executive official conduct within
the outer perimeter of duty, a different rule applies for Bivens actions.
Further, Butz demonstrated the Court's continuing view that a proper
balance of the competing costs and benefits warranted a qualified im-
munity rule for most executive official conduct, whether by federal or
86. Id. at 734-39. In Pulliam v. Allen, 104 S. Ct. 1970 (1984), the Court held that judges are
not absolutely immune from injunctive relief liability for their judicial conduct as well.
87. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
88. E.g., Hernandez v. City of LaFayette, 643 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 1981), cer. denied, 455 U.S.
907 (1982); Bruce v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272 (4th Cir. 1980); Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky,
626 F.2d 607 (8th Cir. 1980).
89. E.g., Ward v. Johnson, 690 F.2d 1098 (4th Cir. 1982) (en banc) (chairman of prison disci-
plinary committee); United States ex rel Powell v. Irving, 684 F.2d 494 (7th Cir. 1982) (parole
board officials); Sellars v. Procunier, 641 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1102 (1981)
(parol board officials). But see Fowler v. Cross, 635 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1981) (parole board offi-
cials protected by qualified immunity).
90. See cases collected in S. NAHMOD, supra note 3, at § 7.08 (1984 Supp.).
[Vol. 62:221
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol62/iss2/3
EXECUTIVE OFFICIAL IMMUNITY
state executive officials. It also showed that at least four Justices were
seriously worried about the potential for disruption of government, es-
pecially in situations when the "grounds for [executive] action are
doubtful, or in which the actor is timid."'"
Four years after Butz, the Butz dissent emerged as prevailing doc-
trine. In Nixon v. F'tzgerald92 the Supreme Court felt compelled to
carve out an absolute immunity exception to qualified immunity for the
President. Also, in the companion case of Harlow v. Fitzgerald,93 the
Court significantly modified the previously established two-part quali-
fied immunity test.
B. Nixon v. Fitzgerald: The President
In 1982 the Supreme Court held, in Nixon v. Fitzgerald,94 that a for-
mer President is absolutely immune from Bivens damages liability95 for
acts within the outer perimeter of his duties. In so doing, the Court
(1) straddled the question whether this Presidential immunity is consti-
tutionally compelled, (2) treated the President differently than it had
treated the highest state executives in section 1983 cases, (3) departed in
part from the functional approach in Butz, and (4) in effect made a
special kind of immunity law applicable only to the President.
In Nixon, the plaintiff sued former President Nixon and others96 for
damages for violating his first amendment rights and certain implied
federal statutory rights in connection with his dismissal as a manage-
ment analyst from the Air Force. Plaintiff claimed that he had been
dismissed in retaliation for his testimony before Congress in which he
spoke of significant cost overruns on the C-5A transport plane. The
district court ruled that plaintiff could proceed against the President on
91. 438 U.S. at 1527 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
92 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
93. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
94. 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
95. The Court's holding does not necessarily grant a former President absolute immunity
from injunctive relief. Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803) (Court threatened to
enjoin the delivery of the seal to a judicial appointment of President). But cf. Supreme Court of
Virginia v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719 (1980), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3124 (1983) (Congress-
men and state legislators are absolutely immune from liability for both damages and prospective
relief); Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975) (speech or debate clause
affords legislators absolute immunity from judicial interference).
96. What happened to these others, two presidential aides, was addressed by the Court in the
companion case of Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
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these claims97 and the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
summarily dismissed a collateral appeal on the immunity issue, relying
on Ha/perin v. Kissinger9" for the proposition that the President is not
absolutely immune.9 9
In an opinion by Justice Powell, the Supreme Court reversed and
held that a President is absolutely immune from Bivens damages liabil-
ity for acts taken within the outer perimeter of his duties. The Court
reviewed federal immunity law in general, observing that certain offi-
cials are entitled to absolute immunity based on common law,'00 that
others are entitled either to absolute immunity or qualified immunity
as a matter of federal statutory interpretation,' 10 and that still others
are entitled to either absolute or qualified immunity as a matter of fed-
eral policy.'0 2 The Court noted that in Butz it had left open the ques-
tion whether other federal officials could show that "public policy"
required that they be protected by absolute immunity. 0 3
The Court went on to hold that a former President, for reasons stem-
ming from constitutional heritage and structure, should be protected by
absolute immunity." The President, first of all, has a unique status
under the Constitution that distinguishes him from all other executives.
Consequently, there is greater concern with diversion of his energies
and interference with his effective functioning. In addition, his visibil-
ity and far-reaching decisions make him an easy target for lawsuits.
Second, the interest of litigants in private suits for damages is out-
weighed by the interest of minimizing the dangers of judicial intrusion
on the President's authority and functions. Third, while absolute im-
munity ordinarily extends to acts in performance of certain functions,
the special nature of the President's office and functions requires that
absolute immunity extend to acts within the "outer perimeter" of his
official responsibility. Presidential status is determinative. Otherwise,
attempts by courts to draw lines among different presidential functions
would involve them in highly intrusive inquiries into presidential mo-
97. 457 U.S. at 740.
98. 606 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1979), aj'd by equally divided Court, 452 U.S. 713 (1981).
99. 457 U.S. at 741.
100. Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896) (Postmaster General).
101. E.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (qualified immunity for state executives);
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (absolute immunity for state legislators). Both cases
were brought under section 1983.
102. Eg., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
103. 457 U.S. at 747.
104. Id. at 749-50.
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tives. Moreover, the existence of other remedies and deterrents ensures
that the President is not "above the law.' 10 5
In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger emphasized that ab-
solute immunity for the President "derives from and is mandated by
the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers." 106 Justice White,
joined by Justices Brennen, Marshall, and Blackmun dissented, argu-
ing that there is no constitutional or policy basis for absolute immunity
for the President, that the majority had improperly refused to apply the
functional approach to the scope of presidential immunity, and that
qualified immunity protection is adequate for the President just as it is
for most federal executives. 10 7
The majority did its best to avoid resting its decision solely on the
Constitution. 1 8 In a footnote, Justice Powell, writing for the Court,
stated:
[W]e need not address directly the immunity question as it would arise if
Congress expressly had created a damages action against the President of
the United States .... Consequently, our holding today need only be
that the President is absolutely immune from civil damages liability for
his official acts in the absence of explicit affirmative action by Congress.10 9
Evidently, the Court was reluctant to constitutionalize presidential im-
munity law completely and preclude congressional action in the area.
This reluctance is consistent with the Court's view of the possible con-
gressional role to be played in connection with the Bivens prima facie
case as well. 10 Until Congress acts, however, absolute presidential im-
munity from damages liability is the rule.
It is significant that the President is treated differently in two respects
from any other high level government executive. For one thing, the
qualified immunity rule for state governors as established in section
1983 cases by Scheuer v. Rhodes"I' does not apply to the President,
even though a state governor is in many respects analogous to a presi-
dent. For another, all other federal and state officials who are accorded
absolute immunity are nevertheless subject to a functional inquiry.
Thus, judges and prosecutors are absolutely immune from damages lia-
105. Id. at 758.
106. Id. (Burger, C.J., concurring).
107. Id. at 764-67 (White, J., dissenting).
108. Contrast the speech or debate clause basis for congressional absolute immunity.
109. 457 U.S. at 748 n.27 (emphasis added).
110. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397.
111. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
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bility only for their judicial and prosecutorial acts. In contrast, the
President is absolutely immune from damages liability for all acts
within the outer perimeter of his duties, regardless of the relation be-
tween such acts and particular executive functions.' 12 Apparently the
Court simply did not want to undertake the arduous line-drawing task
for Presidential conduct.
Once an entitlement to absolute presidential immunity was found
applicable, it was probably inevitable that the scope of that immunity
could not and would not be confined. The Court's rejection in Nixon
of a functional approach may be based on the common sense recogni-
tion that presidential functions are so broad and diverse that, unlike
judging, prosecuting, and governing at the state level, they cannot be so
readily compartmentalized. In addition, a case by case approach to
presidential functions, in order to determine which are absolutely pro-
tected and which are not, would interfere with and distract from presi-
dential activities, and might adversely affect the independence of
presidential decision-making. The Court was also worried about the
potential scope of discovery of presidential conduct which would result
if a qualified immunity rule were adopted. Indeed, this concern with
wide ranging inquiries into, and possible chilling effect on, executive
official conduct is reflected in the Court's modification of the qualified
immunity test in the companion case of Harlow v. Fitzgerald. I 3
For all these reasons, the Supreme Court made executive official im-
munity law applicable only to the President of the United States. Con-
fronted with the spectre of a torrent of Bivens actions against federal
executives generally, the Court drew the line at the President, finding
that he was the only one to whom the predictability of absolute immu-
nity was essential. It may not, however, make much difference, except
for symbolic purposes, that the President is absolutely immune. Even
if the President were only qualifiedly immune, a Bivens plaintiff would
still have to show the President's personal involvement in the claimed
constitutional violation. 1 4 This is a very difficult task. Furthermore,
the President typically acts through his Cabinet and his aides, execu-
112. This scope of immunity standard, it will be recalled, was developed for executive officials
sued for common law torts. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483
(1896).
113. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
114. Cf. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) ("personal involvement" in constitutional viola-
tion necessary for section 1983 liability). Note that in Nixon, the President at first took personal
responsibility for Fitzgerald's discharge, but he later retracted. Nixon, 457 U.S. at 737.
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tives who, after Butz and Harlow, are protected by only qualified im-
munity, even if they conspire with an absolutely immune President.
Thus, a Bivens plaintiff who is otherwise entitled to prevail on the mer-
its will ordinarily not be denied recovery solely by reason of presiden-
tial absolute immunity.' 5
C. Harlow v. Fitzgerald: Second Thoughts About Butz
In Harlow v. Fitzgerald,"6 the companion case to Nixon, the
Supreme Court reaffirmed the Butz holding that executives generally
are protected by qualified immunity. Like Nixon, the Harlow Court
emphasized the costs of qualified immunity to independent decision-
making but, constrained by Butz and Scheuer, the Court could not con-
fer absolute immunity on all higher level federal executives. Instead,
the Court did the next best thing: it substantially modified the qualified
immunity test by removing the subjective part.' As justification for
doing so, the Court reviewed the list of costs imposed on federal execu-
tives protected by the two-part qualified immunity test and, not surpris-
ingly, found those costs excessively disruptive of executive decision-
making." 8 The Court, by eliminating the subjective part, made quali-
fied immunity considerably more protective of defendants and in large
measure converted qualified immunity into the equivalent of absolute
immunity." 9
Harlow involved first amendment and federal statutory claims
against two presidential senior aides who allegedly conspired to violate
the plaintiffs rights in connection with his termination as a manage-
ment analyst for the Air Force. The district court denied defendants'
motion for summary judgment, ruling that they were not entitled to
absolute immunity, a ruling affirmed without opinion by the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court, relying ex-
tensively on Butz, held that the aides were protected by only qualified
immunity because they could not show that public policy required ab-
115. According to the Court, any regulation of conduct function that might be served by im-
posing Bivens liability on the President can be accomplished as well by other avenues, including
impeachment, political accountability, and the availability of damages and injunctive relief reme-
dies against the President's Cabinet members and aides. 457 U.S. at 757-58.
116. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
117. id at 817-18.
118. Id. at 815-18.
119. The Court transformed qualified immunity into absolute immunity in the sense that de-
fendants will more readily be dismissed on summary judgment grounds without reaching the mer-
its of the claim, and without any discovery.
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solute immunity. The Court emphasized that in Butz the Secretary of
Agriculture, a member of the President's Cabinet, had not been given
absolute immunity even though he, like the presidential aides in
Harlow, was directly accountable to the President. 120
The Court also rejected a derivative immunity argument based on
the holding in Gravel v. United States,'2t that certain legislative acts of
senatorial aides are absolutely immune. 2 2 The argument here was that
presidential aides should be absolutely immune for acts which, had
they been performed by the President himself, would be absolutely pro-
tected. According to the Court, this result not only was foreclosed by
Butz itself, but would be inconsistent with the Court's functional ap-
proach in other absolute immunity cases. 123 Although the Court re-
fused to allow blanket absolute immunity protection for "special
functions" of presidential aides, it agreed that absolute immunity might
be justified for their discretionary acts in the areas of national security
or foreign policy. 24 Nevertheless, this possible exception to qualified
immunity was not applicable in Harlow because none of the acts
charged by plaintiff was "within the protected area."
With Butz thus reaffirmed and applied to presidential aides, the
Court turned to the qualified immunity test itself. Acknowledging that
the qualified immunity test, when properly applied, should in theory
"permit the defeat of insubstantial claims without resort to trial," the
Court contended that as a practical matter the subjective part of the test
often prevented such a result.'25 This stemmed from the fact that
courts typically considered an official's subjective good faith as a dis-
puted question of fact which should not be decided on motion for sum-
mary judgment. An official who had prevailed on his motion for
summary judgment with respect to the objective part of the test would
still have to proceed to trial, even though, according to the Court, he
would in most cases ultimately prevail because the plaintiff could not
show subjective bad faith.
120. Id at 808-09.
121. 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
122. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 809-10.
123. Id. at 816-18. Chief Justice Burger dissented, arguing that presidential aides who are
"elbow aides" are in reality presidential alter egos who deserve absolute immunity protection. Id.
at 824 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 812 n.19.
125. Recall the dissent's warning to this effect in Butz, 438 U.S. at 1526; see supra text at note
73. As examples, the Court cited Landrum v. Moats, 576 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1978) and Duchesne
v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1978). Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 816, n.27.
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Consequently, the Court did away with the subjective, "malice" part
of the test, and held that "government officials performing discretion-
ary functions generally are shielded from liability insofar as their con-
duct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known."' 2 6 Reflecting
its general concern with intrusive discovery, 27 as well as its apparently
skeptical view of the merits of the case before it,'2 ' the Court declared
that discovery should not be permitted unless the law, at the time a
defendant acted, was clearly settled. Only if the law was clearly settled
could a defendant be required to know that his conduct was unlawful
and the plaintiff be allowed to proceed with discovery and the lawsuit.
In a very real sense, therefore, Harlow represents a return to the dictum
in Pierson v. Ray 2 9 that an executive "is not charged with predicting
the future course of constitutional law."
Harlow and Nixon emphasize the costs of defending against consti-
tutional tort litigation. Nixon provides the widest possible margin for
error by establishing that the absolute immunity rule applies even to
presidential misconduct that was known to the President to be clearly
unconstitutional when it occurred. While not going so far, Harlow's
modified qualified immunity test still considerably increases the margin
for error of other executives by allowing them to be dismissed from a
suit on summary judgment motion shortly after the onset of litigation
when clearly settled law is not shown. As I argue later, Navarette's
restrictive application of clearly settled law should not be the norm.3
But if it turns out to be, then in many, if not most, cases when execu-
tives have violated constitutional rights, they will in effect be absolutely
immune. They will not be subject to discovery, and the merits of the
claims against them will not be reached. More importantly, the net
effect may well be the underprotection of constitutional rights. Before
this is considered, it will be useful to discuss briefly the Court's ap-
proach to statutory interpretation as reflected in Harlow.
126. 457 U.S. at 818.
127. "In suits against a President's closest aides, discovery of this kind frequently could impli-
cate separation-of-power concerns." Id. at 817 n.28.
128. Both defendants argued, the Court noted, that years of "exhaustive discovery" had failed
to implicate them in wrongful conduct. Id. at 803-04.
129. 386 U.S. at 557.
130. However, such a restrictive application was confirmed in Davis v. Sherer, 104 S. Ct. 3012
(1984). See infra note 168.
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III.: STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND
PREDICTABILITY
4. The Myth of Statutory Interpretation
On its face, section 1983 indicates that no immunities are available to
defendants against whom a prima facie case has been made. Neverthe-
less, since the absolute state legislator immunity decision in Tenney P.
Brandhove,'3 t the Court has dealt with section 1983 immunity issues as
statutory interpretation questions to be resolved against the common
law background which existed in 1871, the year section 1983 was en-
acted. The Court looks at the common law immunity background for
the particular official, asks whether that background is consistent with
the purposes of section 1983, and decides accordingly. Typically, the
common law immunity background carries over to section 1983. In
this way, for example, state legislators, judges, and prosecutors were
given absolute immunity, 32 while police officers were given qualified
immunity.'33 Occasionally, though, the common law immunity back-
ground is not conclusive as, for example, for state executives.' 34 In
either event, section 1983 purposes are examined.
Before Harlow, therefore, the Court addressed section 1983 immu-
nity in statutory interpretation terms. It was becoming increasingly
clear, however, that policy analysis divorced from statutory interpreta-
tion-in the sense of discovering legislative intent or purpose-fre-
quently predominated. The reasons were several. Once the Supreme
Court considered the common law background in a particular case to
be relevant to the existence vel non of some non-absolute immunity,
section 1983's language provided no further guidance on the immunity
question. Also, section 1983's legislative history was of little or no help
on the issue of scope of immunity. 35 Indeed, Justice O'Connor made
131. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
132. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (judges); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409
(1976) (prosecutors); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (judges); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S.
367 (1951) (state legislators).
133. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
134. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
135. This is so unless that legislative history is interpreted as comprehending the "background
of tort liability" in 1871 which could then be used as a source. The Court may have thought it was
doing this inPierson for police officers, but it was not. A close reading of the opinion discloses no
discussion of the state of the law of police officer privilege in 1871. The Court's references were to
the contemporary doctrine of police officer privilege. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 557. Furthermore, even
if there had been some reference to 1871, it would not have been very helpful. The Court's canon
of construction appears to rely on the absence of any express congressional intent to abolish corn-
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such an observation about section 1983 remedy issues in arguing
openly that the proper standard for an award of punitive damages
under section 1983 is primarily a question of policy for the Court to
resolve.' 36 Justice Brennan contended that section 1983's 1871 com-
mon law background should not be used to freeze its development.
1 37
Butz itself, while paying lip service to section 1983 qualified immunity
as an issue of statutory interpretation, hedged somewhat and spoke
also-as it had to, because a Bivens action was involved-of weighty
policy considerations of a functional nature cutting in favor of all con-
stitutional tort defendants.' 38
If there was any doubt that the scope of section 1983 qualified immu-
nity is primarily a function of judicial policy making, it was dispelled in
Harlow. The Harlow Court made no attempt to explain the change in
qualified immunity as a matter of statutory interpretation. 139 It is true,
of course, that Harlow, like Butz, is a Bivens action. Therefore, strictly
speaking, Harlow might not apply to section 1983 actions. But the
Court, in a terse footnote which characterized this possibility as "un-
tenable,"' 40 left little doubt that Harlow's modified qualified immunity
test does apply to section 1983 cases as well as to Bivens cases.14" '
A frank policy-oriented approach to qualified immunity frees the
Court to fashion whatever qualified immunity test it wishes. On the
one hand, this provides judicial flexibility to make changes, as shown
byHarlow. On the other, it provides the opportunity to cut back on the
effective scope of section 1983 by expanding the protection of qualified
immunity.142 Because section 1983's language and legislative history
143
mon-law immunity doctrine, ie., congressional silence. See, eg., Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S.
367 (1951). Needless to say, congressional silence can be readily manipulated. Cf. Patsy v. Board
of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 500 (1982) (exhaustion of administrative remedies not required for sec-
tion 1983 actions; "tenor of the [1871] debates" supported conclusion, but admittedly Congress
never addressed the issue in 1871).
136. Smith v. Wade, 103 S. Ct. 1625, 1658-59 (1983).
137. Id. at 1628 n.2.
138. 438 U.S. at 496-504.
139. Whether the statutory interpretation inquiry is characterized as one into legislative intent
or legislative purpose, see P. BREST & B. LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION-
MAKING 81-82 (2nd ed. 1983), the Court in Harlow did not speak in statutory interpretation terms
at all.
140. 457 U.S. at 818 n.30.
141. The circuits have so understood Harlow. See, eg., Ward v. Johnson, 690 F.2d 1098 (4th
Cir. 1982) (en banc); Saldana v. Garza, 684 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1253
(1983). See also Wolfel v. Sanborn, 691 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1982).
142. If one posits a statute such as section 1983 which on its face creates a far-reaching cause
of action whose wisdom or utility a majority of the Justices question, then one effective way of
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do not address specific immunity issues, a major role for policy was
perhaps inevitable. The important question is what policy. As the
Court regularly has asserted, section 1983's language and legislative
history, if nothing else, make clear that section 1983 is designed both to
deter unconstitutional conduct and to compensate for harm caused.144
These purposes, as well as the fourteenth amendment values they re-
flect, should be taken into account in any qualified immunity policy
determinations. It now remains to be seen whether Harlow's modified
qualified immunity test is properly sensitive to these values.' 45
B. Cost-Benefit Analysis
Harlow's change in the qualified immunity test demonstrates the
Court's increased sensitivity to the costs to defendants of defending
against constitutional tort litigation, 146 at the same time showing the
Court's lack of concern for the financial and psychological costs to con-
stitutional tortplaintiffs of conducting such litigation. It also reflects, in
limiting the coverage and scope of that cause of action is to broaden the coverage and scope of
various defenses.
143. Interpreting statutes by the selective use of legislative history has been compared to
"looking over a crowd and picking out your friends." Wald, Some Observations on the Use of
Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IowA L. REV. 195, 214 (1983) (quoting a
conversation with Judge Harold Leventhal). To the extent this is true for section 1983 interpreta-
tion, it is the unfortunate legacy both of the Court's use of congressional silence about absolute
legislator immunity in Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951), and of the Court's ambiguous
use of the "background of tort liability" in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
Such difficulties involving section 1983 interpretation may be part of a larger problem involving
statutory interpretation in the Supreme Court. Compare Note, Intent, Clear Statements and the
Common Law. Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 892 (1982) wIth
Wald, supra.
144. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238-39 (1972).
145. That is, an approach that neither rejects these values nor significantly understates them.
Enforcing fourteenth amendment values, as mandated by section 1983, must not be eroded by
judicial policy making in the area of qualified immunity which is divorced from those values.
146. As distinct from the costs of being sued and the costs of an adverse judgment. See P.
SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGs 60 (1983). The dis-
tinction is important for the purposes of this Article. The modified qualified immunity test was
not as such designed by the Court to reduce the costs of being sued, ie., those costs stemming from
the filing of the suit itself. In contrast, the availability of absolute immunity significantly reduces
the filing of such suits against certain defendants. Similarly, the modified qualified immunity test
was not viewed by the Court as reducing the likelihood of adverse judgments in light of Harlow's
assertion that under the prior two part test, most defendants who had prevailed on the objective
part through motion would win on the subjective part at trial. Rather, as will be seen, modifying
the qualified immunity test was directed at reducing the costs of defending against constitutional
tort litigation. This being true, however, it is clear that if the modified test works as planned by
the Court, fewer constitutional tort cases will be filed, thereby reducing these two other costs.
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part, the Court's own continuing split over the proper scope of section
1983 liability, a split ranging from local government liability through
punitive damages to standing to seek injunctive relief.147
The Court's list of costs in Harlow, set out in order to justify elimi-
nating the subjective part of the qualified immunity test, is particularly
instructive and merits analysis. The Court first spoke of what it called
general costs, or the individual and social costs of exposure of innocent
defendants to the risks of trial. These included the following: (1) the
expenses of litigation; (2) the diversion of official energy from pressing
public issues; (3) the deterrence of able citizens from accepting public
office; and (4) the chilling effect on the discharge of official duties. 41
As to these general costs, several features are noteworthy. First, the
Court assumed that these are borne by the innocent. While this may be
true, they are borne by the guilty as well. Second, these costs are virtu-
ally identical to the costs discussed in some of the Court's absolute im-
munity cases. 149 The Court never before spoke of these costs in a
qualified immunity setting to justify a change in qualified immunity,
but only to explain why absolute immunity should apply rather than
qualified immunity. 50 In earlier cases, once qualified immunity was
found to be appropriate, general costs, to the extent they were present,
were considered unavoidable and to be borne by defendant officials,
their government employers, and the public at large.
The Court next spoke of what it called the special costs of the subjec-
tive part of the qualified immunity test. It noted that executive discre-
tionary decisions are influenced by a decision-maker's experiences,
values, and emotions. It then observed that: (1) subjective intent can
rarely be decided by summary judgment; (2) there is no clear end to
relevant evidence; (3) discovery is often wide ranging, including the
deposing of professional colleagues as well as numerous other persons;
147. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 103 S. Ct. 1660 (1983) (5-4 decision) (separate, independent
standing inquiries for section 1983 damages and injunctive relief actions); Smith v. Wade, 103 S.
Ct. 1625 (1983) (5-4 decision) (punitive damages liability for individuals even without actual mal-
ice); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) (5-4 decision) (no section 1983 immunity
for local governments).
148. 457 U.S. at 816.
149. Eg. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (absolute prosecutorial immunity from
damages liability).
150. In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), the Court did not question general cost (3).
The Court has, of course, referred to general costs (3) and (4) in cases holding that qualified
immunity, and not absolute liability, is applicable. E.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 313-22
(1975); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-55 (1967).
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and (4) such inquiries into state of mind can cause disruption of gov-
ernment.151 This list of general and special costs led the Court to do
away with the subjective part of the test, because, in its view, federal
courts were not otherwise able to weed out frivolous claims prior to
trial.'5 2 By so doing, the Court may have considerably increased the
margin for error of defendants in section 1983 and Bivens cases.
There are, however, serious questions about the Court's list and its
use of these costs. It is always easy for a court to list costs implicated in
a course of conduct or activity-here, liability for constitutional torts-
that it wishes to discourage. 53 Also, it is beyond dispute that to some
extent, these general and special costs do exist. Indeed, section 1983
and Bivens liability are supposed to have an effect on executive deci-
sion-making. But the Court discussed no data showing that the costs to
government officials of the two-part test in fact had a significant ad-
verse effect on executive decision-making. Additionally, the Court did
not appear to consider all of the costs of modifying the qualified immu-
nity test. Because the two-part test had an additional hurdle, it would
seem to follow that defendants were more often held liable under the
two-part test than they will be under the modified objective test.' 5 4
Consequently there will be more situations under the modified test
than there were under the prior two-part test in which defendants vio-
late constitutional rights with no remedy for plaintiffs. These unremed-
ied violations impose costs on society which have not been, and
perhaps cannot be, measured satisfactorily. Such costs include disre-
spect for authority, disrespect for the constitution and laws generally,
the erosion of fourteenth amendment values, and the prospect that
some executives might be undeterred in connection with fourteenth
amendment compliance. 55 There are also, of course, costs to the indi-
151. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816. Note that state of mind inquiries are frequently relevant to the
prima facde case as well. See generally S. NAHMOD, Supra note 3, at ch. 3.
152. 457 U.S. at 816-19. A similar concern with possible harassment suits against executives
and overdeterrence is addressed in Cass, Damage SuitsAgainst Public Officers, 129 U. PA. L. REV.
1110, 1153-74 (1981).
153. Cf. United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3430 (1984) (Justice Brennan's cost-benefit
analysis observation, supra note **).
154. Circuit court decisions in which defendants failed the subjective part of the test include
e.g., Wolfel v. Sanborn, 666 F.2d 1005 (6th Cir. 1982), cer. denied, 452 U.S. 916 (1981); Williams
v. Board of Regents of University System of Georgia, 629 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
452 U.S. 926 (1981); Flores v. Pierce, 617 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1980); Crowe v. Lucas, 595 F.2d 985
(5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 907 (1982).
155. These costs are also relevant to the argument made later in this Article that the objective
test should not be rigidly applied in a pro-defendant manner.
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vidual, such as the actual harm caused and the feeling of being
victimized.
A related criticism of the Court's approach may be made by consid-
ering the benefits of the prior two-part test. When the Harlow Court
was deciding whether to change the prior test by calculating its costs, it
should also have calculated its benefits, as well as the benefits of the
modified test. Only in this way could the costs and benefits of the prior
test and the modified test have been compared for the purpose of decid-
ing which test was better overall, resulting in greater social benefit.
This is not to suggest that such cost-benefit analysis is or should be
determinative, or even that it is possible for it to be meaningful when
dealing with constitutional compliance. After all, as the Court has as-
serted in other contexts, there are higher substantive values in our con-
stitutional scheme than efficiency, even if calculable. 56 Indeed, it has
been urged that even procedure has value independent of efficiency.'57
Nevertheless, if the Court is going to play the cost-benefit game, it
should abide by the rules.
The Harlow opinion bears a striking resemblance to Justice White's
opinion for the Court in U.S. v. Leon,'58 and his earlier separate opin-
ion in Illinois v. Gates, 59 setting out the argument that the exclusionary
rule is a judicially created remedy for fourth amendment violations
which is to be evaluated by a cost-benefit analysis. Unlike the exclu-
sionary rule, though, and unlike Bivens actions, section 1983 is a con-
gressional creation for the protection and vindication of fourteenth
amendment rights. Congress has already made the decision that as a
156. Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2780-81 (1983) (hold-
ing unconstitutional the congressional legislative veto and stating: "[I]t is crystal clear from the
records of the convention, contemporaneous writings and debates, that the Framers ranked other
values higher than efficiency.") See also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). The Court stated:
Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause
in particular, that they were designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citi-
zenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy that may characterize
praiseworthy government officials no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre ones.
Id at 656.
157. See Laycock, Due Process and Separation of Powers, 60 TEX. L. REv. 875 (1982);
Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculusfor Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v.
Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHi. L. REv. 28 (1970). See also
Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 194 (1982) (fairness as value); McNabb v. United States, 318
U.S. 332, 347 (1943) ("The history of liberty has largely been the history of observance of proce-
dural safeguards.").
158. 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984). See infra note 160.
159. 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2340-44 (1983). See also Posner, Rethinking the FourthAmendment, 1981
S. CT. REv. 49 (exclusionary rule over deters).
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general matter the benefits of fourteenth amendment compliance out-
weigh the costs of such compliance. Thus, judicially overstating costs
and understating benefits in order to limit this congressional remedy
against individual defendants is indefensible. Nevertheless, Harlow re-
flects the Court's determination to run this risk of underprotecting four-
teenth amendment rights, rather than overprotecting them at the
possible expense of independent executive decision-making. 160
As will be seen next, an analysis of the objective part of the qualified
test reinforces this view. Whatever one thinks of the advisability of
doing away with the subjective part of the test,16 1 the clearly settled law
part of the test has the independent potential for dramatically reducing
the scope of liability for executives. This is so because many constitu-
tional rules and their application turn out not to be clearly settled for
liability purposes. Under Harlow, defendants on summary judgment
motion frequently will be dismissed without a consideration of the
merits. This being the case, the Court has, in a constitutional tort con-
text, limited individual liability by converting qualified immunity into
the equivalent of absolute immunity.
C Settled Law, Predictability and Process Factors
The settled law component is closely related to the costs of defending
against constitutional tort litigation. As the margin for error of consti-
tutional tort defendants is reduced, the general and special costs of liti-
gation -described by the Harlow Court will tend to increase.
Conversely, when the margin for error is increased, then these costs of
litigation will tend to decrease. Although Wood's duty to know settled
law initially might have suggested that the margin for error should be
160. Compare United States v. Leon, where the Court held that there should be a "good faith"
exception to the fourth amendment's exclusionary rule when a search warrant is obtained from a
"detached and neutral magistrate." If the Court ultimately goes beyond Leon to adopt generally a
"good faith" test for the exclusion of evidence obtained by police in violation of the fourth amend-
ment, whether with or without a search warrant, then what the Court considers to be improper
judicial interference with police officer decision-making will be reduced even more. Also, the
deterrent effect of both constitutional tort liability and the exclusionary rule will be significantly
reduced as well. Thus, there will be no available remedy in most cases when a police officer
violates a citizen's fourth amendment rights, unless that violation is egregious. For a discussion of
remedies in an exclusionary rule setting, see Barnett, Resolving the Dilemma of the Exclusionary
Rule: An Application of Restitutive Princoles of Justice, 32 EMORY L.J. 937 (1983).
161. If one believes that every defendant who passes the objective part of the test will also pass
the subjective part, and that every defendant who fails the subjective part will also fail the objec-
tive part, then the subjective part will be viewed as superfluous.
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reduced for defendants, 62 Navarette quickly corrected that impression
by turning Wood on its head and using it against plaintiffs. 63 Nava-
rette, it will be recalled, dealt with settled law in three related respects:
Was there a settled constitutional rule at the time of the challenged
conduct? If so, should defendants have known of this rule? Finally, if
they should have known of the rule, should they have known that their
conduct violated this rule?
In Navarette, the Court never got past the first hurdle for the defend-
ants. Refusing to extrapolate from existing case law, the Court held
that at the time of the challenged conduct there was no first amendment
right of inmates to send mail. The Court's message as to the meaning
of settled law was clear: the margin for error of defendants should be
significant. In addition, the Harlow Court found that even when
clearly settled law exists "out there," there may be exceptional circum-
stances when an official is under no obligation to know of its exist-
ence-a second hurdle.'" The scope of this exception remains unclear,
although it may refer to situations where a particular defendant may
not have had meaningful access to legal advice. 65 Moreover, the law
application condition--a third hurdle-requires that defendants know
settled law as applied to their situation in order to be liable. This cre-
ates further play in the joints of the settled law requirement. 166 The
Court may have intended that not only must there be a settled constitu-
tional rule of general applicability, but there must also be a relevant
prior case on point holding unconstitutional the same kind of conduct
as that challenged. 67 Indeed, this intention was recently confirmed by
162. See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text. For criticism of such a reading see Cass,
supra note 152, at 1153.
163. See supra notes 39-49 and accompanying text.
164. 457 U.S. at 819. However, as Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Black-
mun, stated in his concurring opinion, the new standard "would not allow the official who actually
knows that he was violating the law to escape liability for his actions, even if he could not reason-
ably have been expected to know what he actually did know." Id. at 821 (Brennan, J., concurring)
(emphasis in original).
165. See, e.g., Barnett v. Housing Authority of City of Atlanta, 707 F.2d 1571 (11th Cir. 1983);
Treen v. White, 693 F.2d 45 (8th Cir. 1982).
166. This is demonstrated by cases ruling for defendants on such law application grounds.
Eg., Saldana v. Garza, 684 F.2d 1159, 1164-65 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1253 (1983);
Withers v. Levine, 615 F.2d 158 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 849 (1980).
167. Such a rigid approach appears to have been used in Knell v. Bensinger, 522 F.2d 720 (7th
Cir. 1975) and in Shirley v. Chagrin Falls Exempted Village Schools of Bd. of Educ., 521 F.2d
1329 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976).
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the Court in Davis v. Scherer, 6 ' a 1984 decision, which, like Nayare/ie,
found no relevant clearly settled law.
168. 104 S. Ct. 3012 (1984). In Davis, decided in July, 1984, the Court again demonstrated
that it would apply the clearly settled law component in a pro-defendant manner. The Court also
held that a defendant who otherwise passes the Harlow qualified immunity test regarding clearly
settled constitutional law does not lose his or her qualified immunity for violating clearly settled
state law.
Davis involved a 1983 suit brought by a former Florida highway patrol employee-discharged
because of an employment conflict of interest-against officials of the highway patrol for damages
for their alleged violation of his procedural due process rights in not providing him with a formal
prompt pre or post termination hearing. The district court found for plaintiff on the ground that
the defendants had violated clearly settled state law even though plaintiffs due process rights had
not been clearly established at the time he was discharged in 1977. Hence, the defendants' belief
in the legality of their conduct was unreasonable. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, but the Supreme
Court reversed in an opinion by Justice Powell.
The Court began by conceding that the plaintiff's due process rights were violated, but it re-
jected plaintiff's argument that those rights were clearly established in 1977. The Court simply
observed that the Fifth Circuit in 1981 had held that "the State had violated no clearly established
due process right when it discharged a Civil Service employee without any pretermination hear-
ing." Id at 3018. As to the Supreme Court's own prior due process precedents, which earlier
established that some kind of a hearing was required when a property interest may be deprived,
Justice Powell asserted that those precedents did not deal with "minimally acceptable procedures
for termination of employment." Id at 3019. In Davis, the plaintiff had been informed several
times of his employer's objections to his second job and even had presented his reasons to his
employer. Also, the official, who had decided to discharge the plaintiff, had those reasons and
other information before him. Thus, the plaintiff's due process rights to a formal pretermination
or prompt post termination hearing were not clearly established in 1977.
The Court had somewhat more difficulty with plaintiff's second argument that the defendants'
violation of their own personnel regulations--which clearly required a complete investigation and
an opportunity for the employee to respond in writing-undercut the defendants' qualified immu-
nity even though those regulations were not the basis of the plaintiff's claim. While this conten-
tion had "some force," the Court expressed concern that such an approach would render
government officials liable in an "indeterminate amount for violation of any constitutional right
. . . merely because their official conduct also violated some statute or regulation." Id at 3020.
Also, state law-related matters could not always be resolved on summary judgment.
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens dissented on the qualified immunity issue in
a manner consistent with the argument presented in this Article. They focused on whether the
plaintiff's due process rights had been clearly established in 1977 when he was discharged. The
question was "whether governing case or statutory law would have given a reasonable official
cause to know, at the time of the relevant events, that those acts or omissions violated the plain-
tiff's rights." Id at 3022 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Plaintiff was
never told prior to his discharge that his retention of a second job was grounds for termination.
This violated the Court's own clearly established requirements of "meaningful notice and a rea-
sonable opportunity to be heard," regardless of the Fifth Circuit's "dubious and cursory" per
curiam opinion to the contrary in 1981. Indeed, other prior Fifth Circuit precedent was consistent
with the Supreme Court's clearly established due process requirements. Finally, the dissenters
suggested that "the presence of a clear-cut regulation obviously intended to safeguard public em-
ployees' constitutional rights certainly suggests that [defendants] had reason to believe they were
depriving [plaintiff] of due process." Id at 3025. While the violation of such a regulation would
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol62/iss2/3
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All of these hurdles amount to a defacto requirement that a defend-
ant be at least reckless with regard to the application of relevant consti-
tutional law. 169 Otherwise, he or she should be dismissed on motion
for summary judgment. Analogously, the Court has imposed similar
defendant state of mind requirements on plaintiffs in certain defama-
tion cases in order to minimize the "chilling effect" on first amendment
rights. 7 ' These hurdles also suggest that the Court has begun to line
up the qualified immunity test with its rules of retroactivity. 17 1 While a
detailed examination of such rules is beyond the scope of this Article,
the three factor test set out in the leading civil case on retroactivity,
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson,172 makes clear that some, if not all, of these
not necessarily be determinative of the qualified immunity issue, it should be "relevant" to the
Harlow analysis.
Davis warrants several conclusions. First, a majority of the Court intended that Harlow's (and
Wood'r) clearly settled law component be applied in a pro-defendant manner. The Court unfor-
tunately insisted that there be little or no ambiguity in relevant case law as a condition to finding
dearly settled law; a case on point appears necessary. Unlike the dissenters, they would admit no
duty to extrapolate from pre-existing case law. Second, the Court would not consider the viola-
tion of a clearly established state law to be relevant to the Harlow analysis, when constitutional
rights are involved and when the state law is not related to the section 1983 cause of action. In
short, once there is no clearly settled constitutional law violated by a defendant, there is no liabil-
ity for compensatory damages even if clearly settled state law was violated.
169. The word "reckless" is used because in many respects it is a realistic description of the
settled law requirement. A defendant who acts contrary to settled law (i) typically will have some
reason to doubt that he or she is acting legally or (ii) will at least know that he or she does not
know what the relevant law is. Such states of mind have long been characterized at common law
as "reckless," e.g., Sovereign Pocohontas v. Bond, 120 F.2d 39 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (misrepresenta-
tion), although in the defamation setting the Supreme Court has limited the definition of "reck-
less" to the first meaning. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526 (1976).
170. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (private persons; negligence and actual
damages required); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (public officials; knowing or
reckless falsehood required). But cf. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979) (defamation plaintiff
allowed to inquire into media defendants' state of mind despite possible "chilling effect" on edito-
rial process).
171. Such rules have been applied in criminal cases, eag., Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S.
667 (1971); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), and in non-criminal cases, e.g., Cipriano v.
City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287
U.S. 358 (1932). There may even be due process limitations on the retroactive application of
unforeseeable statutory interpretations. Cf. Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969)
(permit requirement for parade violates first amendment because it lacked definite, objective stan-
dards).
Note that the Court's retroactivity rules can also be applied to theprimafacie case in favor of
governmental defendants who are not protected by qualified immunity. See, e.g., Aufiero v.
Clarke, 639 F.2d 49 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 917 (1981).
172. 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
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factors will now be applied in constitutional tort qualified immunity
cases as well.
In Chevron, the Supreme Court was confronted with the applicability
of its limitations decision in Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty and Surety
Co. 173 to a personal injury suit filed several years before Rodrigue
under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act ("Lands Act"). 174 When
the Chevron suit was filed, the prevailing federal rule in such suits
made general admiralty law, including laches, applicable. However,
during Chevron's pretrial discovery proceedings, the Court in Rodrigue
held that state limitations law was applicable to such suits. The plain-
tiff's suit was then dismissed by the district court, under the applicable
Louisiana one-year limitation period.
In its decision on this issue, the Supreme Court held that Rodrigue
should not be applied retroactively to the suit before it. It set out a
three factor test for cases dealing with the nonretroactivity question:
[1] [T]he decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new
principle of law either by overruling clear past precedent on which liti-
gants may have relied or by deciding an issue of first impression whose
resolution was not clearly foreshadowed. [2] '[T]he merits and demerits
in each case [must be weighed] by looking to the prior history of the rule
in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation
will further or retard its operation.' [3] [T]he inequity imposed by retro-
active application [must be weighed] for '[w]here a decision of this Court
could produce a substantial inequitable result if applied retroactively,
there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the injustice or hardship by
a holding of nonretroactivity. ' 175
In holding that Rodrigue was not to be applied retroactively, the
Court emphasized as to the first factor that Rodrigue was a case of first
impression in the Supreme Court under the Lands Act. It overturned a
long line of decisions holding that admiralty law was applicable to per-
sonal injury actions under the Lands Act. Further, the Court empha-
sized that from the time the plaintiff in Chevron was injured and until
he instituted his lawsuit, "[ilt cannot be assumed that he did or could
foresee that this consistent interpretation of the Lands Act would be
overturned. The most he could do was to rely on the law as it then
was."' 176 As to the second factor, the Court, reasoning that the primary
173. 395 U.S. 352 (1969).
174. 43 U.S.C. § 1331-1343 (1976).
175. 404 U.S. at 106-07 (citations omitted).
176. Id. at 107.
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purpose of absorbing state law as federal law in the Lands Act "was to
aid injured employees by affording them comprehensive and familiar
remedies," observed that "retroactive application of the Louisiana Stat-
ute of Limitations to this case would deprive the [plaintiff] of any rem-
edy whatsoever." It concluded: "To abruptly terminate this lawsuit
that has proceeded through lengthy and, no doubt, costly discovery
stages for a year would surely be inimical to the beneficent purpose of
the Congress."' 77
Finally, with respect to the third factor, the Court stressed the drastic
and inequitable result that would occur if the plaintiff's suit were
barred retroactively by Rodrigue. After all, the plaintiff had not "slept
on his rights," his "potential redress for his allegedly serious injury"
was entitled to protection, and he had gone through lengthy and costly
discovery. 178
One function of the Chevron test, as reflected especially in the first
and third factors, is to provide fairness to a party whom a change in the
law has surprised. Another function, however, is closer to an important
legal process concern: can those regulated live with the rule contem-
plated? More specifically, is the rule understandable and can it be
complied with?17 9 A major purpose of rules of constitutional tort lia-
bility in particular is to encourage officials to conform their conduct to
such rules. If the relevant constitutional rule and its application were
not clear at the time the official acted, it makes little sense for regula-
tion of conduct purposes to impose liability. Consequently, a pro-de-
fendant reading of Harlow and settled law appears warranted.
This is too simplistic, however. First, it ignores the compensation
function of constitutional tort liability. Also, and more fundamentally,
understanding the rule, and the ability to comply with it, may be im-
portant process values, but they must be evaluated in connection with
the substantive purpose desired.8 0 Indeed, if this were not so, an abso-
lute constitutional tort liability rule with no immunities whatever would
further the value of understanding the rule, while an absolute immunity
177. Id. at 108.
178. Id.
179. This concern has been described as including the factors of comprehensibility and con-
formability. See Henderson, Process Constraints in Tort, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 911-15 (1982).
Comprehensibility refers to the clarity of the relevant rule, and conformability refers to the ability
to comply with it. Other process constraints, verifiability and manageability, are not as directly
related to this Article. See generally H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS (Tent. ed. 1958).
180. See also Henderson, supra note 179.
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rule would further both values.""1 Each kind of rule would also be
predictable. To make this point differently, consider that all private
persons are subject to tort liability for unreasonable conduct as deter-
mined after the fact by a jury. At common law, tort liability is not
limited to clearly unreasonable conduct; liability results if the conduct
is found to be unreasonable, even if reasonable persons might differ. If
there is a margin for error of potential tort defendants-meaning all of
us-it is rather slim. We all take our chances that a factflnder, second-
guessing our conduct, may find that we acted unreasonably. But this is
so despite the argument that the reasonable person standard may be
too vague to be comprehensible' and that it is sometimes applied in
situations when a defendant in fact can not conform to it. 183 Common
law negligence, therefore, has considerable potential to over-deter or
over-regulate because of the inherent ambiguity in the reasonable per-
son standard.
Yet, after Harlow, this may no longer be true for constitutional tort
liability, and one may legitimately wonder why. Officials in the course
of daily routine admittedly deal with more people than ordinary citi-
zens do and thus their exposure to personal liability may be greater.
This should cut the other way, though, because they can do more dam-
age. 184 It is also probable (or at least not improbable) that for various
reasons many executives have devised "a strategy of personal risk mini-
mization'1 85 which may argue for a wide margin for error in order to
encourage independent decision-making. But the risk of defending
against constitutional tort litigation is only one of many reasons for
such a strategy, if it exists, and there is no assurance that a wide margin
for error will have the desired effect. 186 It would be preferable, despite
Harlow and Navarette,I87 to give settled law a more flexible applica-
tion, as some courts have done,188 and not rule for defendants as a mat-
181. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982); supra notes 90-113 and accompanying text.
182. The short answer, as Prosser gives it, is that "the infinite variety of situations which may
arise makes it impossible to fix definite rules in advance for all conceivable human conduct." W.
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 150 (4th ed. 1971).
183. The classic torts example in Vaughan v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (1837) (reasonable
intelligence and knowledge required even for persons of abnormally low intelligence and little
knowledge).
184. This point is made in Scheuer v. Rhodes in connection with the differences between
higher and lower level executives.
185. P. SCHUCK, supra note 145, at 68. See also Cass, supra note 152.
186. Little is known about this strategy. P. SCHUCK, supra note 146, at 68.
187. See also Davis v. Scherer, 104 S. Ct. 3012 (1984), supra note 167.
188. E.g., King v. Higgins, 702 F.2d 18 (1st Cir. 1983); Scott v. Davis, 691 F.2d 634 (3rd Cir.
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ter of law, so that in the appropriate circumstances executives might be
found to have breached duties to extrapolate from then existing law as
to both the existence of general constitutional rules and their applica-
tion. Indeed, the dissenters in Wood who argued against Wood's duty
to know settled law contended that there is and can be very little, if
any, settled constitutional law.' 89 Their point was a good one, even
though their conclusion was not. Rather, their argument actually cuts
in favor of such extrapolation when the situation warrants it. 9 '
Consequently, an executive's margin for error should not be as wide
as the Court in Harlow and Navarette may have wanted to make it.
Now that the subjective part of the qualified immunity test is gone,191 it
is more important than ever to be sensitive to the need to encourage
compliance with the fourteenth amendment despite the risk of
overdeterrence. The out of pocket costs of such compliance should be
borne by the defendants or their employers, the relevant government
bodies. These costs are as much legitimate costs of government as
other employment costs, especially in the absence of any clear indica-
tion that government decision-making is being seriously hampered.
Otherwise, if individual constitutional tort liability is undercut by ex-
pansion of the scope of individual immunity, there will be even less
incentive for constitutional compliance than there is now.
In this respect it is regrettable that the immunities available to consti-
tutional tort defendants have an all or nothing aspect. That is, if a
defendant prevails on immunity, the plaintiff bears all the costs of the
constitutional violation. If a plaintiff prevails on immunity (after pre-
vailing on the prima facie case) the defendant bears all the costs of the
constitutional violation. This all or nothing aspect is analogous to the
effect of contributory negligence at common law.192 However, unlike
1982); Maxwell v. Mason, 668 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1981); Logan v. Shealy, 660 F.2d 1007 (4th Cir.
1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 942 (1982); Seguin v. Eide, 645 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1981); Johnson v.
Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 745 (9th Cir. 1978); Buise v. Hudkins, 584 F.2d 223 (7th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 916 (1979); Ware v. Heyne, 575 F.2d 593 (7th Cir. 1978); Little v. Walker, 552
F,2d 193 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied 435 U.S. 932 (1978); Wagle v. Murray, 546 F.2d 1329 (9th
Cir. 1976), vacated on other grounds and remanded, 431 U.S. 935 (1977); Slate v. McFetridge, 484
F.2d 1169 (7th Cir. 1973).
189. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 329 (1975).
190. Compare those negligence cases where defendants are treated as if they did know, or at
least were under an obligation to find out, certain information. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 157-
61 (4th ed. 1971).
191. For the questionable argument that Harlow did not eliminate the subjective part of the
qualified immunity test, see McElveen v. County of Prince William, 725 F.2d 954 (4th Cir. 1984).
192. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 190, at § 65.
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the development of comparative negligence to ameliorate this harsh-
ness, 193 a comparative fault approach seems to have little to offer to
constitutional tort liability analysis. Constitutional tort plaintiffs are
seldom, if ever, at fault in any meaningful sense. 194 Consequently, we
must live with the disadvantage of an all or nothing result.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court appears to be amending section 1983 and cutting
back on Bivens actions by the use of various strategies to limit liabil-
ity.' 95 Expanding the functional approach of Butz, conferring absolute
immunity on the President, and changing the qualified immunity test in
Harlow demonstrate this development as applied to individual liabil-
ity. It is no secret that some of the Justices, perhaps a majority, are not
happy with what constitutional torts have become. Also, a majority of
the Court may believe that governmental liability, such as it is, is suffi-
cient protection for citizens in most cases; individual liability may
therefore be considered unnecessary unless extreme misconduct is in-
volved. This latter belief may similarly be reflected in the suggestion
by Justice White'96 that the exclusionary rule should be done away
with altogether because the better approach to police officer compli-
ance with the fourth amendment is for governments to train police of-
ficers and to adopt per se rules.197
Whatever the validity of this belief in an exclusionary rule context or
193. Id. § 67. See generally V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (1974).
194. On the other hand, it might be possible to limit the defendant's liability by reference to
his or her own degree of fault. A defendant against whom the law was clearly settled (i.e., reason-
able persons could not differ) would bear all the violation costs. A defendant against whom the
law was reasonably settled (i.e., reasonable persons could differ) would bear a lesser percentage of
those costs as decided by the factfinder. And a defendant in favor of whom the law was clearly
settled (i.e., reasonable persons could not differ) would bear none of the violation costs.
It is unlikely, though, that the Court which decided Harlow would adopt this kind of approach.
While tending to reduce the costs of an adverse judgment, this approach would not reduce the
general costs of defending against constitutional tort litigation mentioned in Harlow because more
cases would survive defense motions for summary judgment. For the same reason, the special
costs of concern to the Court in Harlow would be increased under this approach to the extent that
state of mind inquiries are relevant to the prima facie case in different situations. See generally S.
NAHMOD, supra note 3, at ch. 3. Moreover, this approach would require even greater sophistica-
tion from fact finders and law-appliers than the distinction between gross and ordinary negligence
does. Under this approach, additional distinctions would have to be drawn among degrees of
ordinary negligence. It thus appears unworkable.
195. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
196. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2340-44 (1983).
197. Id. at 2340. As noted earlier, the Court in United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984),
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elsewhere, it is misplaced in the constitutional tort context. For one
thing, local governments are liable only for their unconstitutional offi-
cial policies or customs. 198 Respondeat superior liability is not avail-
able.199 For another, states2°° probably cannot be sued successfully for
damages caused by their unconstitutional official policies or customs.
Further, the federal government is only liable for certain constitutional
torts under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
Conversely, it might be suggested that governments are in reality al-
ready held accountable to a considerable extent, if only indirectly,
through insurance and indemnification agreements.2z ' If this is so,
then limiting individual liability through excessively pro-defendant ap-
plications of the modified qualified immunity test will make matters
even worse for governmental accountability for constitutional viola-
tions. Such pro-defendant applications may also result in the expendi-
ture of greater governmental resources for determining whether
constitutional rules were previously settled rather than for deciding
what the current constitutional rules are or should be in the first place.
In view of the Court's increasing concern in qualified immunity cases
with costs, this misallocation of resources appears especially ironic.202
There is, finally, an additional irony about the clearly settled compo-
nent of the qualified immunity test. Courts will often be able to avoid
the merits of a constitutional tort plaintiffs cause of action by assuming
arguendo that even if there was a constitutional violation, the law at the
time was not clearly settled; thus, the defendant is not liable for dam-
ages. If this approach becomes prevalent, plaintiffs will have increas-
ing difficulty discovering clearly settled law in subsequent cases.2 13
created a "good faith" exception to the fourth amendment's exclusionary rule when a search war-
rant is obtained from a magistrate.
198. Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
199. Id. at 691-95.
200. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979). The statement is surely accurate for suits in federal
court. However, because Quern relied in part on the eleventh amendment, it is not clear that
section 1983 suits cannot be brought against a state in its own courts.
201. See generaly P. SCHUCK, supra note 146.
202. There has already been extensive litigation in the circuits dealing with the impact of
Harlow. See, e.g., Harris v. Young, 718 F.2d 620 (4th Cir. 1983) (courts struggling with clearly
settled law component of Harlow). See generally S. NAHMOD, supra note 3, at ch. 8 (1984 Supp.).
203. In United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984), Justice White viewed as unwarranted
this concern with freezing the development of fourth amendment doctrine in connection with a
"good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule. See also supra note 160.
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